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ABSTRACT
A Usability Study of FIDO2 Roaming Software Tokens as a Password
Replacement
Brian Rasmussen
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
The use of passwords for user authentication has significant shortcomings. As society
becomes more dependent on the internet and web services, we need to find a replacement
authentication method that users are willing to use. WebAuthn is one potential technology
for password replacement. Recent studies have shown that users enjoy the usability of
WebAuthn and hardware tokens as a password replacement but don’t want to carry them
around. Meanwhile, little to no research involves the use of software tokens. I carried out a
user study of WebAuthn and roaming software tokens when used as a password replacement.
We were able to learn if the shortcoming of WebAuthn and hardware tokens were remedied
by the use of smart phones as software tokens. Software tokens have similiar usability to
hardware tokens and are more usable than passwords. Users continued fearing loss of access
to their account when using software tokens. Users were less worried about carrying an extra
device but replaced that fear with the fear of a dead battery or a broken phone.

Keywords: FIDO2, passwordless
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Passwords are the most common form of online authentication, but each year the risk
associated with passwords becomes more apparent. One of the problems with passwords is
the sheer amount of accounts the average user has. Expecting a user to remember a unique
password for each account is impractical and has caused excessive password reuse. Das et al.
found that 51% of those surveyed reported that they reuse old passwords and an additional
26% modified a pre-existing one [5]. Along with having to deal with a plethora of accounts,
many security measures require users to have passwords with high complexity. Password
complexity is encouraged by increasing password length and including a mixture of uppercase
and lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols. A study by Wash et al. was able to show
that passwords that are more complex or have higher entropy have a higher likelihood of
being reused [16]. Password reuse by itself is not detrimental to overall account security,
but because of other security vulnerabilities, such as data breaches and hacked accounts,
password reuse is highly discouraged. The combination of data breaches and password reuse
has caused many users to be susceptible to credential-stuffing attacks. Akamai, the content
delivery network, recorded more than 88 billion credential stuffing attacks between January
1st, 2018, and December 31st, 2019 (2 years), [1].
In 2012 Bonneau et al. introduced the seminal paper The Quest to Replace Passwords:
A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes. This paper
introduced a framework for judging potential password replacements by using a list of criteria
that compare the security, usability, and deployability of alternate authentication methods.
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Because the framework has 25 different criteria, it is unlikely that a password replacement
will check all the boxes. Instead, the framework helps us see the pros and cons of each
authentication method and how different password replacement stack up against each other.
One of the newest attempts to replace passwords is Fast IDentity Online 2 (FIDO2),
which allows users to authenticate by using public-key cryptography and either a hardware
token (resembling a USB drive) or a software token (stored on a smartphone). FIDO2 consists
of Web Authentication or WebAuthn and Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) protocols.
WebAuthn provides an API for web browsers to interact with FIDO tokens, including both
single-factor authentication (1FA) or in tandem with other authentication methods for secondfactor authentication (2FA) and multiple-factor authentication. CTAP defines the protocol
for the Client, usually the browser, to communicate with an authenticator, which is either a
hardware or software token. The different mediums of communication include USB Human
Interface Device (HID), Near Field Communication (NFC), Bluetooth Smart, and Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE).
Because FIDO2 supports use as a 1FA, it is a potential password replacement option.
Although FIDO2 is relatively new, it has support from major companies such as Google,
Yubico, and Microsoft. Most major browsers now support FIDO2, including Google Chrome,
Edge, Firefox, and Safari. An authenticator has two types, cross-platform and platformspecific. Cross-platform authenticators are roaming devices, such as hardware tokens or
mobile devices. Platform-specific authenticators only work for the device in which they reside,
such as Face ID and Touch ID on Apple products or Windows Hello on Microsoft products.
Although most major browsers support FIDO2, it is difficult for the general public
and online services to adopt new forms of authentication. One of the reasons that passwords
have remained the most prevalent form of authentication is because it is hard to motivate
users to change to a new system. There have been two recent user studies that explored if
users would be willing to switch from passwords to using FIDO2 [12] [7]. Both studies noted
that users are willing to switch to passwordless authentication but are less enthusiastic about
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having to carry around a hardware token.
However, it is unclear whether users view smartphones used as software FIDO2
tokens differently than hardware tokens when used in the context as a password replacement.
Accordingly, I carried out a user study that follows the same design as Lyastani et al. [12],
but instead of using hardware tokens, I used software tokens in the form of a smartphone app.
Users who participated in the study registered and logged into two mock websites by using a
provided mobile device as a roaming authenticator. This was done so the user could gain and
opinion about roaming software tokens as password replacement. I used the Krypton app
and Chrome extension. Krypton provides cloud-based communication between the browser
and smartphones and also implements all the steps required for the phone to be used as a
software token for FIDO2. This allowed me to study software tokens in the context of FIDO2
and password replacements.
The study’s results showed that users found roaming software tokens for 1FA more
usable than passwords. When compared to roaming hardware tokens, there was no significant
difference in the two forms of 1FA. Users were less concerned about carrying around an
additional item but were concerned with dead phone batteries, installing another app, and
needing to log in when their phone is in a different room. Some user worries continued to exist
when comparing hardware and software tokens, namely what happens if their authenticator
is lost, stolen, or destroyed. The System Usability Score (SUS) [4] is a strong predictor of
whether users accepted the software token as a replacement for passwords, while Affinity for
Technology Interaction (ATI) [8] and Privacy Concern (PC) [10] are poor predictors.
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Chapter 2
Related Work

One of the contenders for password replacement is password managers. Password
managers do not replace passwords, but they do address many of the security issues with
passwords. When a user correctly uses password managers, there is no password reuse, and
the passwords are cryptographically secure [13]. However, studies have shown that users
misuse password managers. Lyastani et al. found that only 53% of passwords stored in
LastPass, a password manager, were unique [12]. They also found that Chrome Autofill users
and users without any form of password manager reused 80% of their passwords [11]. In
addition to password reuse, there are also some usability and security issues. One of the
most touched upon usability issues is logging in on a non-personal device, such as a library
computer. If the password manager uses the cloud, then you can log in to any device with the
proper application or browser extension. The problem persists if you do not have permission
to add extensions or download the right software. Another issue with password managers is
the dependency on the master password. If an attacker ever learns a user’s master password,
they may gain access to all of a user’s accounts. Additionally, if a user forgets or loses their
master password, they also lose access to all of their accounts.
Another approach to password replacement has been federated login services, such as
Facebook Connect, Google OAuth 2.0, Mozilla Persona, and OpenID [14]. By using federated
login, a user only has to login to the first service, and they gain access to other accounts
on different websites. One of the main drawbacks of using a third-party service to facilitate
single-sign-on is the leakage of privacy. The third party now knows about all accounts the
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users log in to, which is a privacy concern [6]. Another issue is that if one account is ever
successfully attacked, the attacker now has access to all the services instead of just one.
Because users have a hard time remembering passwords; one idea has been to move
to graphical passwords. Some examples of graphical passwords include sketching images or
symbols, recognizing a sequence of pictures, and remembering specific positions on images
[3]. Graphical passwords have some promise, but there are a few issues. Shoulder-surfing, or
looking over someone’s shoulder to see their password, is a real risk with graphical passwords.
Additionally, graphical passwords take more time to input and are more expensive for websites
because they have to store and display images for users.
A category of authentication that has gained some steam is biometrics. There are
a few common biometrics, such as fingerprint readers, eye scanners, and facial recognition.
These biometric readers have found their niches for authentication for devices such as a
mobile device or a laptop. Biometrics are considered acceptable for authentication for a
personal device but not always for websites. One issue that applies to all forms of biometrics
is that biometrics are not unique across websites. If someone uses their fingerprint to log in
to the website “A” and into website “B” and website “A” leaks the fingerprint, then the user
is no longer secure on the website “B.” In the same scenario where a fingerprint is lost or
stolen, the users can not reset the fingerprint for the website because they can not change
their fingerprints [9]. Another issue is user privacy because the biomarkers for a user are
unique. When a user registers at a website with a biometric it allows other parties to track
the user across domains. An example is if a user registers at the website “A” and the website
“B,” then the website “A” could sell information about the user to website “B” because the
user biometrics are unique.
There have been two recent studies in the field of WebAuthn and passwordless login.
The first study, by Lyastani et al., involved ordinary users and was a lab study [12]. The users
were given hardware tokens and completed tasks, which included registering and logging into
websites provided by the researchers. After completing the tasks, users completed surveys to
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measure their opinions about FIDO2 hardware tokens as a password replacement. According
to the survey, one of the advantages of passwordless authentication is that users no longer
have to remember passwords. On the flip side, users now have to carry around a hardware
token, and 39% of participants disliked the need to carry an additional item. Users also
worried about losing access to their accounts if the hardware token was lost or destroyed.
There were other concerns with the use of hardware tokens, such as new devices that lack USB
ports, accessing an account on a public device, allowing relatives to login to their account,
and revocation. The second study conducted by Farke et al. tested the use of hardware
tokens with 8 employees at a small company [7]. The employees were encouraged to use
the hardware tokens but could use any form of authentication they wished. The researchers
recorded each login, the authentication used, and how long each authentication process took.
Also, periodically throughout the four weeks, the study interviewed employees about their
experiences with the different forms of authentication they use. A repeated remark from
the users was that a password manager auto-fills the username and password, making the
authentication process quick. A common concern was that moving to this new authentication
method took more time than many users were willing to invest. In summary, the users
preferred password managers because it is quick and already set up. The study emphasized
and noted that the four week period was not sufficient enough time to overcome the user’s
accustomed form of authentication, the password.
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Chapter 3
User Study Design

I conducted a user study that focused on how users perceive and react to using
roaming software tokens (smartphones) for passwordless authentication. Although the two
studies previously mentioned got promising results, there were a variety of issues raised that
correlated directly to hardware tokens. These issues include but are not limited to having
to carry an extra item, lack of USB ports, fear of compromised accounts if the hardware
token is lost, and loss of access if the hardware token is damaged. I carried out a user study
following the steps by Lyastani et al. but used software tokens in place of hardware tokens.
By using similar methods, I was be able to contrast the results of my study with theirs to
compare the usability of hardware and software tokens.
One of the key issues users had with hardware tokens is the need to carry around an
additional item and the worry of losing it. With many users already carrying smartphones
with them, I believed that software tokens would address most of the issues users have with
hardware tokens. Thus I had the following hypotheses:
 H1: Users will consider software tokens to be more usable than hardware tokens for

authentication.
 H2: Users will prefer using software tokens and FIDO2 over traditional text-based

authentication.
The communication options between a browser and a mobile device are limited. The
Chrome browser currently supports USB HID and platform-specific means of authentication.
I decided not to use USB HID because only the newest phones have this technology, which I
7

didn’t have easy access to. Google is currently working on Cloud Assisted BLE (caBLE),
but as of now, it is unavailable. To circumvent this limitation, I used Krypton, which
allowed the use of software tokens. Krypton is a phone app and browser extension that
turns a smartphone into a software token. Krypton accomplishes this by facilitating secure
communication between the browser and the mobile device.
Krypton achieves secure communication by having software on both devices, the
browser, and the phone. The communication between the two devices acts as CTAP, which
allows the phone to be an authenticator. To pair the phone with the browser, Krypton uses
a QR code to set up encryption keys between the devices. After the browser and the mobile
device pair, the browser and the mobile device register with Amazon’s Simple Notification
Service (SNS) and Simple Queue Service (SQS). With the registration at the Amazon services
and the public-private keys shared via the QR code, Krypton now has a secure and encrypted
channel to act as CTAP and treat the phone as an authenticator.
I recruited students from campus so that I have a similar demographic to the original
study, which allowed me to compare my results with the previous paper. I was able to recruit
30 participants.
By following the same methodology as Lyastani et al. and recruiting from a similar
population, college students, I was able to do a between-subjects user study by using the
data the Lyastani et al. has already gathered. I was able to compare the usability of software
tokens to hardware tokens by determining if the same issues and results Lyastani et al. found
manifested themselves with software tokens.
Once I had recruited the participants, I followed the same procedure as outlined by
Lyastani et al., which included the following seven steps.
1. Welcome message
2. Topic introduction. Users watched a short video introducing authentication security
and familiarized the participants with common threats and the abuse of leaked account
credentials. The video explained these topics from the view of “Alice,” an average but
8

fictional user.
3. (Steps 3-5 just for FIDO2 Users.)
Introduction to FIDO2. The participants watched another short video introducing
software tokens and the pros and cons of using them for 1FA. It is paramount to explain
new technology because research has shown that users will rate new systems poorly if
they do not understand them. This video also explained the technology from the view
of “Alice.” All videos we created were modeled after the videos in Lyastani et al.
4. Attention-based question (To make sure participants paid attention)
5. Setup Video (1FA) Step by step about registration and authentication process.
6. Hands-on task. Users registered and logged in to mockup websites Fakebook and
Schmoogle. In order to register users had to first install Krypton and pair the phone
with the browser by scanning a QR code. This established a secure communication
between the browser and the phone. When registering and logging in users clicked a
button on the website and then approved on the phone.
7. Surveys - that measure the following
(a) Usability – system usability scale (SUS) [4]
(b) Acceptance – A scale from Van Der Laan et al. [15]
(c) Affinity for Technology Interaction (ATI) [8]
(d) Privacy concern (PC) [10]
(e) Demographics
(f) Qualitative questions
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Chapter 4
User Study Preparation

4.1

Videos

Lyastani et al. used three different videos in her study, all from the perspective of “Alice.”
The first explains the importance of choosing strong passwords, the second introduces FIDO2
hardware tokens, and the third shows how to setup a FIDO2 hardware token. Because the
second and third videos in their study are specific to hardware tokens, we could not reuse
them but had to make our own. We decided to redo all three videos, so that we could have
continuity between them. To make the difference between the two studies as small as possible,
we created new videos in the same style as the originals. Figure 4.2 shows the similarities. To
further increase the likeness between the two works, we used the same scripts from Lyastani et
al., with modifications to specify phones, software tokens, and Krypton in place of hardware
tokens. We include our scripts in Appendix B, with bold, underlined text showing changes

(a) Image from our video 1

(b) Image from Lyastani et al. video 1

Figure 4.1: Comparison of videos
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(b) Schmoogle registration page

(a) Fakebook registration and login page

Figure 4.2: Screenshots of the mock websites

we made.

4.2

Mock Websites

In Lyastani et al., they used mock websites called Fakebook and Schmoogle that mimic
the look of Facebook and Gmail for logging in. We likewise made similar mock websites.
First, we wrote a simple application server using Golang that allowed for registration and
logins with FIDO2. Then, we then created the mock websites Fakebook and Schmoogle.
We already had a Fakebook website for another project, so we modified it to use FIDO2
instead of text-based passwords. This required (a) removing passwords fields in the UI, (b)
switching the communication with the server to use WebAuthn, and (c) adding the javascript
calls to use CTAP. Without access to an already built Schmoogle website, we had to create
one from scratch. We built the Schmoogle website with FIDO2 allowing for passwordless
authentication.
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Chapter 5
Study Results

The user study started Wednesday, June 3rd, 2021, and ran until Wednesday, June
30th, 2021. A total of 30 participants completed the survey. User participants took between
25-35 minutes and received 12 USD as compensation. Brigham Young University Institutional
Review Board approved this user study.

5.1

Demographics

We recruited from BYU’s campus by posting fliers on bulletin boards located in campus
buildings. The targeted audience was college students, so we created the fliers with BYU
students in mind.
We had 30 participants, with 17 male, 12 female, and one non-binary or other. The
participants were from the ages of 18-32, the average age being 23 years old. All of the
participants were current BYU students.

5.2

SUS

We used SUS to measure the perceived usability of roaming software tokens. SUS uses
10 questions with 5 possible answers for each question, ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. Each question is worth 10 points with a total score of 100. A score of 68
is considered average. Figure ?? shows a boxplot of the results. The average SUS given
to Krypton by participants in our study was 81.67: the high was 97.5, the low 42.5, and a
standard deviation(SD) of 11.61. A score of 80.3 is considered an “A,” so on average the use
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of roaming software tokens for 1FA was well received.
From Lyastani et al., passwords received a score of 71.92 with a standard deviation
of 11.09. That means our average of 81.67 was significantly higher than normal passwords;
t(76) = 3.70, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .86 These results support the findings Lyastani et al.
that FIDO2 as a password replacement is more usable than passwords. When we compare
hardware tokens to roaming software tokens, the results show little difference. Hardware
tokens received a SUS score of 81.79, while software tokens received a score of 81.67. The
minimal difference in scores shows that hardware tokens and roaming software tokens have
similar usability; t(74) = 0.04, p > 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.01 These results show that there is
no significant difference in the usability of hardware tokens, which means we reject H1.
One user gave software tokens a SUS of 42.5 which is significantly lower than the
rest of the users. The second lowest score was 67.5 which is 25 points higher. In the open
response portion of the survey the user explained their dislike for Krypton. They thought
that using a phone as an authenticator was overly complicated. In addition they found that
having to switch back and forth between a computer and browser to be tiresome. They also
mentioned that in order to log in you need to have your phone on you constantly which is
not a reality for them.
One user gave software tokens a SUS of 42.5, which is significantly lower than the
scores given by the rest of the participants. The second-lowest score was 67.5, which is 25
points higher. In the open response portion of the survey, the user explained their dislike for
Krypton. They thought that using a phone as an authenticator was overly complicated. In
addition, they found that having to switch back and forth between a computer and a browser
to be tiresome. They also mentioned that to access an account requires you to have your
phone on you, which is not always possible for them. The user seemed to be wholeheartedly
against using a phone for authentication.
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Figure 5.1: System Usability Scores from participants
5.3

Acceptance

Acceptance consists of 9 questions with 5 options. Each question receives a score between 1 and
5, with higher scores considered better. Using an unpaired two-sample t-test shows significant
higher score with roaming software tokens than with passwords; t(76) = 4.4, p < .001, Cohen’s
d = 1.02 The t-test confirms H2 which shows us that users accept roaming software tokens
more than traditional passwords. When compared against roaming hardware tokens there
was no significant difference between the two; t(74) = 0.8, p > .05, Cohen’s d = 0.0.19 The
t-test for hardware and software tokens shows us that software tokens have similar acceptance
to hardware tokens.

5.4

Predicting Acceptance

We used ATI, PC, and SUS to determine if any of this helps predict whether a user is likely
to accept Krypton as a password replacement. ATI consists of 9 questions with 6 possible
options. Each question receives a score from 1-6. Privacy Concern (PC) has 4 questions with
7 possible questions. These surveys don’t grade Krypton directly but allow us to see if a
correlation between users accepting Krypton and their PC, ATI, and SUS results exist.
We performed simple Linear Regression using ATI, PC, and SUS as predictors for the
acceptance of Krypton and FIDO as a password replacement. We created three linear models
14

Acceptance
Predictors b
CI
Sus
0.176 [0.122, 0.229]
ATI
-1.000 [-2.099, 0.099]
-0.237 [-1.420, 0.945]
PC

R2
p
0.616 < 0.001
0.110
0.074
0.006
0.685

Table 5.1: Results of linear regression models to predict acceptance

with one predictor for each model. Table ?? shows the results. The ATI and PC models both
performed poorly with R2 of 0.110 and 0.006 respectively. The SUS model did considerably
better with a R2 of 0.616 The models show us that of the surveys we used SUS is the best
indicator of whether users will accept FIDO2 software tokens as a password replacement. We
gave a linear model ATI, PC, and SUS as predictors and got an R2 of 0.685. The difference
from just using SUS to using all three survey results as predictors is minimal. The minimal
difference further shows that SUS is the best indicator of acceptance. The combination of
the three is slightly more than SUS by itself but not by a substantial amount.
These results are very similar to the results from Lyastani et al. In both studies SUS
was the biggest predictor of whether a user would or would not accept FIDO2 as a password
replacement. The model in Lyastani et al. that uses SUS as predictor had an R2 of 0.428; this
is almost 0.2 lower than the score we got. This difference may seem drastic but it really has
little meaning as the two models should not be directly compared. The models in Lyastani et
al. used robust regression based on MM estimators and used an adjusted-R2 . Our models
were OLS regression and the R2 ’s were not adjusted. What we can see is that in both studies
SUS was the best predictor for users acceptance of FIDO2. Additionally, in both studies ATI
and PC did little to predict whether a user would or would not accept FIDO2 as a password
replacement.

5.5

Qualitative Results

Looking at free-response questions helped us understand more of the pros and cons the users
felt about roaming software tokens. We used standard qualitative content analysis to code
15

the data, with two researchers coding each question independently. The researchers then
compared codes and resolved any disagreements. These codes were then combined to into
more general themes, with the results presented below.

5.5.1

Phone Usage

Many users worried about losing access to their accounts if they couldn’t use their phones for
some reason. 21 out of 30 (70%) users mentioned this worry in some form, this is 31% higher
than the user’s concerns concerning hardware tokens. Most of the users weren’t concerned
about carrying around an extra device, but more so if they forgot their phone somewhere or
the phone’s battery was drained. Participant 23 said, “The only disadvantage I can think
of is is one’s phone were to die or if they were to change phones.” The use of smartphones
seems to heighten user’s worry of the device becomes unusable or lost.

5.5.2

Krypton for 1FA

The use of Krypton to facilitate 1FA was well-received 24 out of 30 participants mentioned
that it was easy, simple, or straightforward to use. Of the remaining 6 participants, they
mentioned that it was “ordinary” and “overly complicated” or were neutral in their opinion.
A drawback mentioned by a handful of users was having to click the cancel button. Having
to click the cancel button is a disadvantage of using a chrome extension to facilitate the
communication between the phone and the browser and could not be avoided. We could have
avoided this problem if there was a built-in method of communication between smartphones
and the browser. A few participants mentioned that it was annoying that the authentication
only works with computers previously paired with your device. This restriction makes it
harder to login into accounts while not at home or using their laptop. One user also mentioned
the use of account sharing, specifically that it limits access to your account to that one phone
which can be frustrating.
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5.5.3

Switching to Krypton across accounts

Many users mentioned that they would be willing to use Krypton, but only for low-risk
accounts that they regularly use, e.g., social media accounts. The main reason given was in
case their phone was lost, stolen, or broken. Participant 26 said, “ I would [use Krypton],
but only for less important accounts. I still feel like independence from my phone is desirable
when I am trying to get into more important accounts.” The common thread was that
users were willing to use their smartphones to authenticate accounts where their loss was
not detrimental. For high-risk accounts, such as banking and email, users mentioned they
would prefer to stick with passwords so that if the authenticator was broken, stolen, or dead,
they could still access their account. A few of the users mentioned that if they did switch to
Krypton, they would use it everywhere, the all or none mindset. For the users who were on
the edge if they would use Krypton or not, it was dependent on whether there was a viable
means of recovering their account.

5.5.4

Mobile trust

Users were confident or content with the perceived security of the app. Participant 13 did
say, “The only disadvantage I see is if there are apps on the phone that can take information.”
This user has a legitimate worry about malware and its ability to compromise the security
of authentication. The participant didn’t distrust the Krypton app but more so using
their phone to authenticate. Participant 17 mentioned distrust of the Krypton Chrome
extension, stating that a QR doesn’t seem secure if someone only needs to scan a QR code
on your computer to register their device. This comment indicates a lack of understanding of
Krypton’s communication and authentication model.
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5.6
5.6.1

Discussion
Software replace hardware?

From the study, we found out that users thought that the usability of hardware and roaming
software tokens are comparable. User’s complaints seemed to switch from having to carry an
extra device to their phone being uncharged, in a different room, or forgotten at home. In
Lyastani et al., users feared thieves could access their accounts if they stole their hardware
tokens. In this study, users did not raise that issue. This issue was probably not raised by
users because many users use pins or biometric authentication to lock their phones. The
complaints from this study are all associated with the loss of access to their account(s). Loss
of access to accounts has been a common finding in most papers, including the work done
by Lyastani et al. The FIDO alliance currently recommends that users register multiple
authenticators because the “The loss or breakage of a single FIDO authenticator is minimally
impactful to the user when an additional authenticator is readily available” [2].
Account recovery is a complex topic, one possible remedy to this problem is to follow
the advice of FIDO and have users register with their mobile device and a hardware token.
The hardware token would address the issues when the smartphone becomes unusable because
of a dead battery, was broken or lost. One possible problem is if the user carries their
hardware token with them, e.g., on their keyring. If someone loses their phone, e.g., left
their bag containing their phone somewhere, there is a good chance that their keys are also
in the lost bag. This situation would essentially defeat the purpose of having the second
authenticator. If the user kept the hardware token at home, it would also cause issues. If
they are away from home and their phone died, they wouldn’t have access to their accounts.
The next logical step would be to have their mobile device and two different hardware tokens,
one for the keyring and one at home, as a backup. The 2 backup hardware tokens would
defeat the purpose of using a mobile as an authenticator because the user would still have to
carry around an additional item. Additional research is needed to solve this problem so that
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hardware tokens or software tokens can be a viable password replacement.

5.7

Establishing Trust

As mentioned in section 5.5.4 one user distrusted the use of QR codes as part of pairing
the phone with the browser. The distrust of the QR code pairing shows a common problem
with new authentication methods. User’s misunderstanding of technology causes distrust
of the new technology. The QR pairing that Krypton requires is to allow communication
between the browser and the phone. The QR code is not part of the authentication process,
which means that the QR code can’t be the “weak link” attackers use to attack Krypton
and the mobile phone. This problem of users misunderstanding new technology is hard to
overcome because many users are not interested in learning about the technology or don’t
pay attention to the explanation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

This study further cemented the work done by Lyastani et al. that users accept
FIDO2 as a usable password replacement. The user’s acceptance of FIDO2 is reflected
in the confirmation of H2. The hope in this study was to address the issues raised by
users in Lyastani et al., primarily carrying around an additional item. When we introduced
smartphones, they didn’t remove issues but instead replaced them with new problems. We
replaced the annoyance of carrying an additional item with the fear of temporarily losing
access to accounts. When users authenticated with smartphones, they gave strong SUS and
Acceptance scores, this further showing that FIDO2 as a password replacement is possible.
The biggest hurdle we perceive is users worry about loss of access to their accounts. If we
could address this hindrance, it would drastically improve the chances of FIDO2 getting
accepted as a password replacement.
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Appendix A
Surveys
A.1

System Usability Scale (SUS)

Please state your level of agreement or disagreement for the following statements based on
your experience with Krypton. There are no right or wrong answers. (Strongly disagree;
Disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Agree; Strongly agree.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
A.2

I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
I found the system unnecessarily complex.
I thought the system was easy to use.
I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system.
I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
I found the system very awkward to use.
I felt very confident using the system.
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
Acceptance

Please judge using Krypton to login to websites using the following adjectives.
Useless
Unpleasant
Bad
Annoying
Superfluous
Irritating
Worthless
Undesirable
Sleep-inducing

◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Useful
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Pleasant
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Good
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Nice
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Effective
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Likeable
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Assisting
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Desirable
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Raising alertness
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A.3

Affinity for Technology Interaction (ATI)

In the following, we will ask you about your interaction with technical systems. The term
”technical systems” refers to apps and other software applications, as well as entire digital
devices (e.g., Mobile phone, computer, TV, car navigation). Please indicate the degree
to which you agree/disagree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong
answers. (Completely disagree; Largely disagree; Slightly disagree; Slightly agree; Largely
agree; Completely agree)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
A.4

I like to occupy myself in greater detail with technical systems.
I like testing the functions of new technical systems.
I predominantly deal with technical systems because I have to.
When I have a new technical system in front of me, I try it out intensively.
I enjoy spending time becoming acquainted with a new technical system.
It is enough for me that a technical system works; I don’t care how or why.
I try to understand how a technical system exactly works.
It is enough for me to know the basic functions of a technical system.
I try to make full use of the capabilities of a technical system.
Privacy Concern

Please state how much you agree or disagree to the following statements. There are no right
or wrong answers. (Strongly disagree; Disagree; somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor
agree; somewhat agree; Agree; Strongly agree.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
A.5

I am concerned that companies are collecting too much information about me.
I am concerned about my privacy.
To me it is important to keep my privacy intact.
Novel technologies are threatening privacy increasingly.
Technical Problems

Were there any technical problems while watching the video and trying out Krypton?
◦
◦
◦
◦

No problems
Few problems
Some problems
Many problems
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A.6

Further Qeustions

How do you choose your password for a new email account?
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦

Reuse an existing password
Modify an existing password
Create an entirely new password
No answer
Other

Has ever one of your passwords been leaked or been stolen?
◦ Yes
◦ No
A.7

Demographics

Please indicate your gender.
◦
◦
◦
◦

Male
Female
Other
No answer

Please indicate your highest educational degree.
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦

High school graduate
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Diploma
Ph.D
Other

How old(in years) are you?
Please indicate if you have a computer science background.
◦ Yes
◦ No
Please indicate your area of studies/area of work.
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A.8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Open-ended Questions
How would you describe your general experience with Krypton?
Which advantages do you see in the usage of Krypton?
Which disadvantages do you see in the usage of Krypton?
Would you use Krypton yourself?
If you would, why and on which accounts would you use it? If you wouldn’t, why not?
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Appendix B
Scripts
B.1

Video 1

This is Alice. Alice has various online accounts for her social networking, emails, file storage
and so on. Alice needs a password for every single account. Everyone uses passwords because
they are supported on all websites, are easy to use and a cheap way to secure accounts
because you do not have to pay extra to use them. It is very practical that Alice uses her
passwords everywhere, for example on her own smartphone, while being on the street on her
laptop, while sitting in a Cafe, or even on a public computer in a library. One day Alice is
watching the news and sees that the service Schmoogle she is using has been attacked. Many
customers’ data including passwords has been stolen. Alice doesn’t know if her account has
been compromised, but Schmoogle recommends that all of its users change their passwords.
Alice has to change all of her passwords, even on different unrelated sites because she reuses
the Schmoogle password for other accounts. Alice knows that simple passwords, which are
easy to remember, can be guessed very easily by the thief. To make her passwords safer Alice
now tries to find a long and complex password, which is unfortunately hard to remember.
Alice is happy because she creates unique and strong passwords for all of her accounts and
feels safe again. The next day Alice installs a new program on her computer. She doesn’t
know that this program is actually a computer virus that monitors her input to the computer
for passwords and leaks it to a cyber criminal. Although Alice has changed her password to
a complex and long word to avoid it being guessed, it doesn’t help her in this situation, since
the virus steals her password directly on her computer when she logs into the Schmoogle
website. Alice notices that her password was stolen because something happened on her
account. Alice directly goes to an expert who can delete the program and the virus from
her computer. She now knows that she has to choose safe passwords and be careful with
programs she installs on her computer. Alice is happy because her computer is safe again
and nothing important from her data got stolen.
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B.2

Video 2

Alice thinks about other ways that she could secure her accounts. A friend recommends that
she try passwordless authentication, which is also supported by her Schmoogle email service.
But what exactly is passwordless authentication? When using passwordless authentication,
you can use a phone instead of a password to log in. One possibility is an app called Krypton, which uses your phone to securely store secret information for logging into
accounts. With Krypton no passwords are needed when logging into an account. You just
tap the phone to verify you want to login to your account. Krypton can be used for different
accounts. This sounds great to Alice because she has had bad experiences with passwords in
the past. She decides to try out passwordless authentication for Schmoogle and downloads
Krypton for free. When Alice uses Krypton instead of a password, the server just stores
public information from the App that Schmoogle needs to verify Alice’s phone has the
correct secret information. That means that no secret information from Krypton can
be stolen that allows the thief to gain access to Alice’s Schmoogle account or any other
account where Alice is using Krypton. Krypton stores any secret information securely on
the phone separate from the computer where the login is taking place. Thus Alice can use
Krypton without a virus or malicious software being able to steal her information.
B.3

Video 3

Alice wants to see how this setup works. Okay, let’s see how Alice can set up and use
passwordless authentication for her Schmoogle account. Alice adds the krypton extension to her browser and downloads the Krypton app onto her phone from the
google play store. Alice opens Krypton on her phone and Chrome on her laptop
and scans the QR code with the app on her phone. Her phone is now paired with
her browser. She goes to the Schmoogle website and creates a new account. As usual, she
enters her first name and her last name. Of course she also has to choose a username. The
Schmoogle website explains to her that Schmoogle supports passwordless authentication
with an App, and Alice does not have to set a password for registration or login when she
creates her new account. The Schmoogle website instructs her to now use her App. Alice’s
phone is already connected to her computer and a notification pops up which allows Alice
to log in by pressing a button. Now Alice has successfully registered her new Schmoogle
account using her phone instead of a password. To login into her Schmoogle account she
simply has to enter her username and when instructed by the website use her phone to
authenticate. She has now successfully logged into her Schmoogle account Alice also wants to
use passwordless authentication for a new Fakebook social network account. Like Schmoogle,
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Fakebook supports passwordless authentication with a phone. Alice enters her first and last
name as well as her email to register a new Fakebook account. When registering Alice is again
instructed to use her phone by pressing the Notification on the phone. After successfully
registering Alice can log into her Fakebook account by just entering her email address and
then using her phone. To successfully log in she simply has to press the notification on
her phone. If she would use a different phone than her own phone she could not login
successfully. Since she is using her own phone she can access her Fakebook account and now
start making new friends or following her existing friends. Now it’s your turn to try out how
passwordless authentication works
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Appendix C
Themes from Qualitative Responses
Topic and Themes
A.

Usability of Krypton
A.1 Easy to use
A.2 Fast
A.3 Complicated

B.

Advantages of Krypton
B.1 No need to remember password
B.2 More secure
B.3 Already carry phone

C.

Disadvantages of Krypton
C.1 Lose account access with phone issues
C.1.A Dead battery
C.1.B Broken phone
C.1.C Misplaced phone
C.1.D New phone
C.2 Always have to have your phone on you
C.3 Doesn’t work with non-paired computers
C.4 Hard to share account access with family members

D.

Would you use Krypton?
D.1 Yes
D.2 No
D.3 Maybe
D.3.A If everyone uses
D.3.B If account recovery was resolved

E.

What
E.1
E.2
E.3
E.4

accounts would you use Krypton with?
All
Everywhere except email
Non important/social media
Would not use
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